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THINKING ABOUT THE STATE: 
LAW REFORM AND THE CROWN 
IN CANADA 
In August 1985, the Law Refonn Commission of Canada released a working paper 
entitled "The Legal Status of the Federal Administration." The working paper calls 
for a re-examination of the concept of the federal Crown in Canadian law. In this 
article, Professor Cohen undertakes a mcntical examination of the focusandmethodology 
of the Commission's work Professor Cohen commends the Commission for its excursion 
into the field of law refonn and the state, but points out that this working paper 
represents an incomplete andjlawed treatment of the subject. In light of this, Professor 
Cohen proceeds to describe and evaluate what in his view are the more significant 
ideas involved in the study of law refonn and the state. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 1985, the Law Reform Commission of Canada released 
a working paper, ambiguously entitled "The Legal Status of the Federal 
Administration."l The paper purports to lay the foundation for the most 
radical transformation in Canadian administrative regulation since 
Diceyian concepts of the Rule of Law were applied to disputes between 
bureaucrats and individuals during the late nineteenth century. In reality 
it calls, albeit tentatively, for a re-examination of the concept of the 
federal Crown in Canadian law and the recognition of a unitary federal 
administration. At this preliminary stage the Commission suggests the 
establishment of a special regime of law that would be applied to define 
the relationship of individuals and the Canadian state. 
@ Copyright, 1986, David Cohen. 
* Visiting Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Legal Starus of the Federal Admink~arion (Working 
Paper No. 40) (Ottawa: The Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985) [hereinafter Working 
Paper]. The reasons for the current federal interest in the legal status of the federal administration 
are unremarkable. Certainly reform can be justified on narrow grounds - the patriation of the 
Constitution and the concomitant need of the state to "formalize its special pre-eminence"; internal 
inconsistencies in the law; and clarification of the law (at 1-4). These are not, however, the most 
pressing reasons for activity in this area. Rather, reform is demanded by the dangers to liberty 
and self-government associated with bureaucratic and majoritarian power, by the inadequacies of 
the current legal review processes, and by the failure of judges to recognize the benefit-defining 
and -granting functions of the state. 
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The working paper will certainly interest common-law lawyers, for 
it represents an attempt to stand back from the details of Crown liability 
cases that employ and distort common-law concepts.2 The traditional 
contract, tort, trust, restitution, and property concepts that have been 
developed in common-law superior courts in the context of disputes 
between individuals, bureaucrats, and the state stand to be transformed, 
if not replaced, by entitlements and institutions designed specifically to 
apply to the individual-state relationship. 'Law reform and the state' 
demands that we describe the outlines and philosophy of a comprehensive 
theory of state appropriate to its role in Canadian society as we move 
into the twenty-fist century. 
Although the Commission does not describe its project as I do, I 
do not think that anyone will disagree with the magnitude of the questions 
that we face. To what extent should we retain the concept of Crown 
in federal law? Should we replace the concept of Crown with the concept 
of state or federal administration? How does one define those terms? 
And what ought to be the relationship of the state to individuals? When 
and how should individuals receive compensation and protection from 
the state and bureaucrats?3 In particular, when and how should we as 
individuals receive compensation when the state or bureaucrats interfere 
with what we are, have, need, or deserve? What is the appropriate response 
when there has been inadequate delivery of public and private goods 
allocated by the state? To what extent should the majority be bound 
by its prior decisions, and to what extent should bureaucrats be obligated 
to deliver services defined in part by the majority? The Commission 
does not directly acknowledge that it plans to look at these questions; 
it certainly does not answer them in this working paper. There is little 
doubt, however, that an enquiry into the "legal status of the federal 
administration" involves precisely those questions and demands answers 
to them. 
Calls for reform in this area began after the First World War and have accelerated since 
then. See, for example, H. Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in England" (1919) 32 Haw. 
L. Rev. 447; H. Laski, ''The Sovereignty of the State" in H. Laski, Studies in the hoblem of Sovereignty 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917) 1; E. Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort" (1924- 
25) 34 Yale LJ. 1, 129, 229; (1926-27) 36 Yale LJ. 1, 757, 1039; W. Friedmann, Law in a 
Changing Society, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) c.11; P. Craig, "Compensation 
in Public Law*' (1980) 96 LQ. Rev. 413 at 434-35; P. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies 
for Official Wrongs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
The law reform process must focus as much on institutional design and competence as 
on substantive rules. See A. Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281; N.K. Komesar, "Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy 
for Constitutional Analysis" (1984) 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366; O.M. Fiss, "The Social and Political 
Foundations of Adjudication" (1982) 6 Law & Hum. Behavior 121. See Palmer v. Nova Scotia 
Forest Ind& (1983),2 D.L.R. (4th) 397 at 500. 
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The Commission should be commended for this bold excursion into 
territory that has remained beyond the intellectual imagination of most 
legal academics in Canada) During the past decade there have been 
several texts? as well as innumerable articles: dealing with the state 
or the Crown. All of them, with the exception of a study on compensation 
in the case of regulatory change: treat the state within the conceptual 
framework of private tort, contract, or property law. In a recent article, 
Professor J.C. Smith and I attempt to develop a different theory of public 
entitlement in individual-state relations.8 We argue that individuals should 
be entitled to benefits that the state has allocated to them, and we develop 
a model that can be used to define those benefits. Upon reflection I 
am not sure that our views are correct, but to the extent that we 
acknowledge that private law doctrine is an inadequate tool to resolve 
individual-state conflict, I think we are right. 
It is enough to say here that we recognize the impossibility of 
accepting that the state should always be treated like a private firm, 
or that common law rules should be applied to bureaucrats for whom 
the state may or may not be vicariously liable. The state (or community) 
has no private analogue, and, in developing legal concepts and a public 
policy of the state, we should not carry with us the conceptual baggage 
of another era, designed to deal with other problems. The Commission 
There have been no Canadian books or articles written in English that attempt to describe 
a general legal theory of state, and the relationships among individuals, the community, and 
bureaucrats. At the same time Quebec has produced a number of significant theoretical offerings 
in this area. See Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 89-100. 
M. Aronson & H. 'Whitmore, Public Torts and Confracrs (Sydney: Law Book Co. Ltd., 1982); 
P. Hogg, Linbility of the Crown in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Sydney: Law 
Book Co. Ltd., 1971); J.D.B. Mitchell, The Confracrs of Public Authoriries A Cornparafive Srudy 
(London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1954); G.E. Robinson, Public Authoriries and Legal Liability (London: 
University of London Press, 1925); Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Legal Position 
of the Crown (Working Paper No. 7) (Vancouver: The Law Reform Commission of B.C., 1972); 
C. Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982). 
Many of the articles are contained in the bibliography of the Working Paper, supra, note 
1 at 89-100. Other significant articles in Canada include A.W. Mewett, "The Quasi-Contractual 
Liability of Governments" (1959) 13 U. Toronto LJ. 56; M. Bridge, "Government Liability, the 
Tort of Negligence and the House of Lords Decision in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council" 
(1978) 24 McGill LJ. 277. 
The article by J. Quinn & M. Trebilcock, "Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory 
Change" (1982) 32 U. Toronto LJ. 117, attempts to develop a general theory of compensation 
that does not require the injured individual to articulate a claim within the traditional common 
law doctrinal categories. See also L. Kaplow, "An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions" (1986) 
99 Harv. L. Rev. 509. 
It should be recognized that many American theorists, in developing ideas about compensation 
in cases of state takings, have engaged in similar analyses. See J. Sax, "Takings, Private Property 
and Public Rights" (1971) 81 YaleLJ. 149; F. Michelman, "Property,Utility, and Fairness: Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law" (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165. 
8 D. Cohen & J.C. Smith, "Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public 
Law" (1986) 64 Can. B. Rev. 1. 
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recognizes this in several contexts. In defining the relationship of 
individuals and the state the Commission recommends that we recognize 
the particular way in which the state exercises unilateral power as well 
as the enormous range of benefits and services provided by the modern 
state. They recognize that the way in which the state exercises power 
demands innovative and enlightened responses. 
The Commission's work is, however, as yet incomplete, and this 
suggests that the problem of law reform and the state must be approached 
carefully in the future. While the work to date is important, it is flawed 
for several reasons. First, the methodology of the Commission's work, 
focusing on theoretical and abstract analyses of the state, is extremely 
circumscribed. Second, the focus of the paper on the 'legalization' of 
the relationship between the individual and the state may be shortsighted. 
Third, the paper fails to distinguish adequately between concerns with 
bureaucracies and concerns with majority tyranny. In this article I describe 
and evaluate the more significant ideas involved in the study of law 
reform and the state in light of those concerns. 
11. DEFINING THE STATE 
The question of law reform and the state, as the Commission 
conceives it, requires that the interests of the state be balanced with 
the interests of the individual. Leaving aside for the moment what we 
mean by the state, and why we focus on individual rights and interests, 
the balancing metaphor is itself an indication of a failure to articulate 
the real issues. The balancing metaphor is the classic paradigm of 
twentieth-century legal thought. While it is a comfortable adjunct to a 
utilitarian, rationalistic ideology, it reveals little. It assumes an intellectual 
process in which a neutral observer, applying a metaphysical measuring 
device independent both of her or himself and of what is being weighed, 
scientifically determines and calculates the sum of the 'weights' of freedom, 
dignity, individual privacy, bureaucratic autonomy, class solidarity, ma- 
joritarian wishes, efficient program design and implementation - all 
of which are somehow measureable on the same scale. The metaphor 
distorts the reform process, which must involve articulating and expressing 
our views and feelings towards these things, explaining why and how 
we value them, and designing a social policy that reflects these values.9 
In undertaking the task of reforming the law of Crown liability 
and associated concepts, the Commission briefly describes the chaotic 
See R. Dworkin, Taking Righfs Seriourly (London: Duckworth, 1978) at 26. G.E. White, 
n2e American Judicial Tr&m Prom of Leading American Judges (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976). 
Heinonline - -  24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 382 1986 
19871 Law Refonn and the Crown 383 
and confusing historical treatment of the 'Crown' in English and Canadian 
law. There is no attempt to order the confusion, and the Commission 
acknowledges that the historical inconsistencies and contradictions in 
the treatment of the concept of the Crown cannot and need not be 
rationalized. Judges, legislators, and writers who use the term do not 
choose their words carefully, nor are they always talking about the same 
thing. When we use one word to describe the monarch herself, the 
institution of regal power, the concept of sovereignty, the constitutional 
head of state, judicial institutions and actors, the cabinet, the executive 
branch of government, individual ministers, government departments 
established under legislation, Crown corporations, and individual civil 
servants, it is not surprising that confusion reigns. 
What we must do is think about the state, government, or Crown 
in a way that recognizes the political reality of Canada at the end of 
the twentieth century. That, the Commission suggests, requires two major 
shifts in our legal view of the world. First, the concept of Crown should 
be relegated to its formal and traditional function as constitutional head 
of state.10 Discarding monarchical terminology and limiting the Crown 
to its purely formal role would reduce terminological confusion, historical 
biases, and anti-democratic and inegalitarian concepts insofar as they 
affect individuals in their relationships with bureaucrats and the majority. 
Second, and much more important, individuals who are injured (or are 
less well off) as a result of decisions and actions of the majority of 
citizens acting through their elected representatives, or the decisions and 
actions of individuals or institutions purportedly carrying out the directions 
of the majority, should be considered as having direct claims against 
the administration. The Commission suggests that we recognize the legal 
status of the federal administration, which would replace the archaic 
and confusing legal status of the Crown. Thus the central point of law 
reform and the state is conceived to be the need for unification of the 
federal administration - and the application of a uniform legal system 
of rights, privileges, and immunities to it. While the implicit transformation 
of Canadian political structure into a somewhat unusual form of re- 
publicanism would eliminate three hundred years of confusion as to what 
is meant by Crown, it will not remove the need to define what is meant 
by administration. 
The Commission fails, however, to provide us with a meaningful 
or workable definition of administration. The Commission's functional 
lo At the same time, anyone who studies law reform and the state can quite easily avoid 
examining the privileges and immunities pertaining directly to the person of the monarch, and 
the Commission states that it is not concerned with that issue. Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 
25-26. 
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concept of "a collection of material and human resources existing to 
give concrete effect to legislation, manage public services of general 
concern, and provide assistance benefits"11 is part of the idea. But we 
are also talking about the responsibility of bureaucracies and individual 
bureaucrats who act selfishly, individuals and institutions who exercise 
power under the authority of law but who can be considered independent 
of the state, and so on. The suggestion of a functional definition of the 
state seems to me to make sense -one can retain the symbolic virtues 
of the Crown and its history (if one wants to), while simultaneously 
ensuring that a public policy of the state reflects our current values as 
to what the majority can and should do to (or for) individuals and 
minorities, and what bureaucrats can and should do to (or for) them. 
Our decisions can incorporate an instrumental rationale if we want to 
restrain the majority and bureaucracies. Current Crown liability rules 
can do the same, but are certainly less likely to do so, and do so less 
openly. 
In defining the relationship between individuals and the community, 
we must understand what we mean by the state or the administration, 
and our appraisal should not be drawn too narrowly. The state (and 
it may be prejudging the issue to refer to it as the federal administration) 
can be conceived of in the narrowest of terms - the Crown - or in 
the broadest - all individuals and institutions whose activities and welfare 
are a consequence of legal power. The concept can be extended to 
individual state employees; individual state contractors; institutions such 
as hospitals and educational institutions that receive all or part of their 
funding from public sources; corporations established by the state; 
corporations owned privately but whose legal existence is the result of 
state action; corporations owned, controlled, and influenced by state 
employees; individuals able to exercise power as a result of state action; 
professional governing bodies; the courts, judges, and prosecutors. 
Government departments and institutions exercising specific statutory and 
regulatory powers are only the more obvious elements of the state. We 
must recognize that power is exercised in an infinite variety of ways 
- the exercise of extra-legislative executive power by the cabinet, the 
exercise of power by judges and state-employed 'Crown' attorneys, the 
exercise of power by individuals and institutions funded from public 
resources, or controlled or influenced by elected representatives and 
institutions, and the exercise of power by individuals and institutions 
who are able to do so only because the state permits them to act collectively 
in corporations and to own private property. All of these are examples 
l1  Ibid at 9. 
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of the exercise of power that requires the implicit acceptance, if not 
support, of those who control the machinery of government and force. 
In this sense, the state is everything, and what we must do is decide 
when and how we want to recognize public individuals and institutions 
in a different way than we currently recognize private individuals and 
institutions. The differences among what we call the Department of 
Transportation, what we call Air Canada, and what we call Canadian 
Pacific Airlines are differences of degree. None could exercise power, 
either externally or internally, without the institutional structure that 
permits them to do so. The state is that structure and is part of all social 
organization.12 
The functional definition suggested by the Commission is only a 
first step in the development of a theory of state - and an uncertain 
step at that. The "collection of material and human resources imple- 
menting legislation" leaves out an enormous range of individuals and 
institutions that can be thought of as the state. The idea that we should 
recognize a functional definition of a 'federal administration' is a nice 
one, but I think that anyone who seriously engages in law reform in 
this context will discover some difficult and provocative paradoxes when 
they further develop their ideas about the state.13 Nonetheless, the questions 
must be asked, and I agree that the starting point for meaningful answers 
l2 Thus in one sense the state can be conceived to be the structure of society; it is more 
than the formal institutions of legal power, the bureaucracy, or the aggregation of individuals who 
are considered part of the community. 
We have developed, over the centuries, sophisticated systems of public and private law that 
define and regulate the relationship among and between individuals and corporations. The struggle 
worked out in that arena forms part of, and is shaped by, that system of law. We do not yet 
have a complementary system or law that defines and regulates the relationship of individuals 
and the state. 
Martin Carnoy argues that "it is the State, rather than production, that should and will be 
the principle focus of class struggle." M. Carnoy, The State and Polifical Theory (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1984) at 9. What the recent deluge of literature on 'Crown liability', 
'litigation and the government', 'government liability', and so on reveals is that legal institutions 
and actors will be part of that struggle. 
l 3  One of the most difficult paradoxes is to understand the conceptual, moral, and political 
problems involved in determining whether and how present governments should be able to determine 
the liability o f f u ~ r e  governments. The dynamic concept of state, a constant fluid concept (never- 
ending, yet continually changing), suggests that we must rethink our notions of private obligation, 
which assume the desirability of permitting our present selves to bind our future selves. As well, 
our ideas evolved from corporate ownership and transfers of liability and risk in the case of private 
enterprise. It is not clear why future governments, to the extent that they reflect electoral desires, 
should necessarily be confronted with irrevocable decisions reached by prior governments reflecting 
a different majoritarian consensus. 
One can see these ideas reflected in specific common law and statutory rules that require 
actual authority and parliamentary appropriation of funds for contractual payments as prerequisites 
to legal liability in contract. Attorney-General for Ceylon v. AD. Siha (19531, [I9531 A.C. 461 
(P.C.); Dunn v. Macdonald (1897), [I8971 1 Q.B. 555 (C.A.); R v Transworld Shipping hd (1975), 
61 D.L.R. (3d) 304 (F.C.A.); Fmcia l  Administration Act, RS.C. 1970, c. F-10, ss 25,33. 
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must be a recognition of the modem bureaucratic state.14 There is no 
reason to retain outmoded, inegalitarian, status-bound concepts of the 
Crown and her prerogatives and privileges in designing a theory of state 
liability for Canada. That would lead us, as the Law Reform Commission 
suggests, to conclude that we should recognize the executive branch of 
the state - in effect, recognize a republican form of government at 
least in the context of disputes in which individuals seek to obtain financial 
compensation from public resources. The historical and perhaps political 
necessity of recognizing the Queen as formally superior to democratic 
institutions should not interfere with public policy analysis. 
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW REFORM 
The methodology of law reform at this stage of the Commission's 
work is extraordinarily narrow, and the ideas they develop are necessarily 
constrained by their perspective and methodology. Discussions with the 
Commission's staff suggest that additional research involving case studies 
and empirical analysis of compensation practices are currently under 
way. Nonetheless, so far the research methodology is characterized by 
reliance on legal academic sources and a superficial review of cases 
from common-law provinces and Quebec. It specifically rejects historical 
analysis - and justifies this decision by a need for "clarification and 
rationalization" that would be futile if history were to explain the world.15 
It is clear to some of us that the law consists of inconsistencies and 
that denying them is not the path to either understanding or progress. 
Moreover, how can one understand the world in a totally abstract, 
ahistorical context? The Commission attempts to excise a specific political, 
social, and economic institution from the society that gives it meaning, 
provides it with resources, and in which it functions and is transformed. 
Writers like Atiyah, Friedman, Horwitz, and Danzig, with their insightful 
historical studies of legal evolution and of the relationship of economic 
history to law,l6 have persuaded many of us that to attempt to study 
law in an ahistorical context is to ignore many of the forces that have 
shaped the institution and its relationship with the courts. 
-- - - 
l4  See Recommendation 1 of the Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 84, and the discussion 
at 84-85. 
Is Ibid at 6. 
l6 See P.S. Atiyah, 7he Rise and FaU of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); 
L.M. Friedman, A Histoy of American Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975); M. Horv~itz, 
The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); 
R. Danzig, "Hadley v. Baxendak A Study in the Industrialization of the Law" (1975) J. Leg. Stud. 
249. 
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The narrow methodology of law reform is reflected, as well, in the 
neglect of the considerable American material drawing on economic 
analysis of law,l7 and theories of bureaucratic organization, decision 
making, and policy implementation18 that might have informed the 
Commission's work. American writers, including Reich, Stewart, and Frug, 
have written extensively on controlling bureaucratic powers,l9 the de- 
velopment of property rights in government benefits?O and the recognition 
of private rights in cases of state action21 - precisely the issues presented 
in thinking about the legal status of the state. Finally, the examination 
or development of case studies in Canada and elsewhere that might inform 
us of the reality of state action and of attempts to obtain compensation 
from the state has not been conducted. 
This narrow methodology and an associated reliance on an impres- 
sionistic view of the world is best reflected in the Commission's jus- 
tification of a specific proposal - to abrogate the historical Crown 
immunities and privileges by allusions to concerns with constraining 
federal bureaucrats. It speaks of the British model of state liability and 
compares it with "the French or German solutions, in which much greater 
progress has been made in subjecting the Administration to the law and 
judicial control."22 The Commission does not inform us of the French 
or German models of state liability, but even those of us who are familiar 
with these continental regimes have no idea of the data upon which 
the Commission based its conclusions regarding bureaucratic account- 
ability. A further example of abstraction is the Commission's analysis 
of the problems associated with government liability in a federal state. 
Here we read about the "theological mystery" of eleven monarchs and 
one Queen, and consubstantiation.23 There is no analysis of the practical 
l7 See M. Spitzer, "An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort" (1977) 50 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 515; L. Blume & D.L. Rubinfeld, "Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis" 
(1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569. 
See G.B. Doern & R.W. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) at 137- 
61; H.A. Simon, Adminisb-ative Behavwur, 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1976); A. Downs, 
Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); P. Sabatier & D. Mazmanian, "The 
Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis" (1980) 8 Pol. Stud. J. 538; D. Van 
Meter & C. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework" (1975) 
6 Admin. & Soc. 445; J. Pressman &A. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1973) at 69, 135, 143. 
l9 G.E. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" (1984) 97 Haw. L. Rev. 
1193. 
20 R. Stewart & C. Sunstein, "Public Programs and Private Rights" (1982) 95 Haw. L. Rev. 
1 195. 
21 C. Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LJ. 733. 
22 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 11. 
23 Ibid. at 13. 
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and political problems created by the existence of eleven democratically 
elected and accountable legislatures, eleven bureaucracies, and eleven 
electorates attempting to tax one another and to regulate and interfere 
with one another's policy objectives and programs.24 The problems 
associated with federalism deserve far more sophisticated analysis. The 
Commission makes no reference to ministries of intergovernmental affairs, 
federal-provincial conferences of first ministers, or negotiations of 
federal-provincial agreements. 
The failure of the Commission to undertake any serious case studies 
of federal-provincial relations, and its reliance on abstractions such as 
"various embodiments of the same sovereign,"25 are not helpful. In the 
end, one wonders why a Law Reform Commission should study such 
a complex institution relying on cases and articles from legal texts.26 
Law reform that takes this approach is particularly ineffective, at least 
in part because of its methodology. Perhaps the case studies and empirical 
research currently under way at the Commission will provide a stronger 
foundation for future thinking. 
IV. DICEY AND THE STATE 
The Commission, after arguing for the recognition of the federal 
administration, then makes a critical error. Perhaps to pacify entrenched 
conservatives, it draws on nineteenth-century Diceyian concepts of the 
Rule of Law27 and the twentieth-century Charter of Rights and Freedoms28 
24 There is, admittedly one brief reference to "political" problems, but no one can argue that 
this is analysis. See ibid at 16. 
Later in the Working Paper the Commission raises the problem of federal initiatives being 
subject to provincial regulatory programs in the context of its analysis of the deficiences of judicial 
review. Here, the problem of interprovincial relations is reduced to allusions to interpretive rules. 
Again there is no discussion of inter-governmental relations and the consultative processes that 
have been developed in this context. Ibid at 55-56. See also ibid at 13-16. 
25 Ibid at 13. 
26 See Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning (Chair: 
H.W. Arthurs) (Ottawa: Information Division, Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada, 
1983) at 70; H.W. Arthurs, "Paradoxes of Canadian Legal Education" (1973) 3 Dal. LJ. 639 
at 657. Arthurs suggests that law reform agencies could be seen as doing research on law, which 
he defines as research using methodological tools and analytical models derived from non-legal 
disciplines that are used to evaluate, understand, and criticize law and legal institutions. The Law 
Reform Commission, at least in this working paper, did not fulfill Arthurs' somewhat optimistic 
views since virtually all of its research involved studying cases and legal articles and texts. 
27 See A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 
1959) at 202. 
28 Part I of the Constitution Acr, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
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to justify the argument that, on the basis of formal equality, the 
administration should be treated like a private firm - at least, the 
Commission believes that we should take this as our original position 
for the purposes of its argument. Putting aside the ambiguities of the 
Rule of Law, or perhaps reflecting those ambiguities, the Commission 
later recommends the development of a special legal regime applicable 
to the federal administration. If one believes, as Diceyians would, that 
the application of particular preferential mks to the administration 
somehow violates the Rule of Law, then certainly the creation of a special 
system of law and process does so to an even greater degree. I have 
no quarrel with the suggestion that the federal administration be subject 
to liability rules and processes different from those applied to private 
firms, but the justification for such different treatment cannot be a concern 
with the Rule of Law. 
My quarrel is not, however, with the internal inconsistency and 
tautology of using the Rule of Law in this way. Rather, I cannot accept 
the Diceyian idea that one should 'legalize' the relationship of individuals 
and the state. The Commission's error arises from several sources. One 
is the methodology of the analysis, which I have described earlier. The 
second is a failure to articulate what Dicey was advocating. The third 
is the unwillingness of the Commission to examine critically the underlying 
structure of private law. 
It is disturbing that in the modem Canadian state so much of law 
reform still relies on Dicey and yet fails to discuss what Dicey was 
advocating. The only possible explanation for Diceyian arguments is that 
the politics of law reform require comfortable models of legal argument. 
Anyone familiar with Dicey understands that he was a conservative - 
he believed that majoritarian values expressed in democratic institutions 
(which were slowly becoming more democratic during his life) were 
dangerous to his concepts of security and rights to property. He was 
temfied of bureaucratic power and recognized the unreality of political 
accountability as applied to much of the bureaucracy. Finally, he did 
not believe in the legitimacy of the state as an institution providing goods 
and services directly to the public - the welfare state, whatever its 
rationale, could only lead to domination of private interests. These beliefs 
led Dicey to design a legal model of the state embodying two central 
characteristics. First, he believed that we ought not to recognize the state 
as the subject of legal analysis. If the state did not exist in law, it would 
be logically impossible to recognize in it a legal obligation to provide 
benefits to individuals. Whatever one thinks of the assumptions of law, 
the logic of this argument is powerful. 
Heinonline - -  24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 389 1986 
390 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 24 NO. 2 
Second, Dicey believed, and modem advocates of individual rights 
confirm,29 that an effective way to control public bureaucratic power 
is to make bureaucrats as individuals subject to the same system of legal 
rules as non-bureaucrats. The function ofjudicial review as Dicey designed 
it is, at least in part, to frustrate or deny the achievement of the community's 
objectives in favour of others. That much is obvious, and it is disappointing 
that the working paper could not articulate it. Dicey's conception of 
the Rule of Law consisted of several ideas, including one that every 
person "whatever be his rank or condition" is subject to ordinary law 
and to the ordinary courts.30 He specifically excluded from consideration 
any argument that bureaucrats should be subject to different rules or 
different institutions. He spoke of administrative law and administrative 
tribunals in France as "utterly unknown to the law of England, and indeed 
. . . fundamentally inconsistent with our traditions and customs."31 Dicey 
recognized the unreality of theoretical Crown powers32 and argued that 
the legal responsibility of bureaucrats, and thus their effective control 
by judges and courts, resulted from the refusal of the court to recognize 
that any act could be done by the state33 and from the personal legal 
liability of individual bureaucrats.34 The Commission must have been 
aware that Dicey was not ignorant of Crown immunities, but rather 
constructed a system that he believed would more effectively constrain 
bureaucratic conduct and the community than would a droit administrifs 
The point is that Dicey was consumed with 'legality', with the control 
of  collectivist^ legislation notwithstanding its source in the majoritarian 
values of even a limited democracy, and with the displacement of 
bureaucratic values by judicial values. Law reform involving the legal 
status of the federal government must speak to the debate between those 
who would control the state by regulating its individual components and 
those who would recognize the institution of the state and ignore its 
real actors. It is far too late to return to Dicey and to ignore recent 
29 Recent legislative hearings in the United States have considered amendments to the Federal 
Tort Claims Act to provide for the direct liability of the United States government. See H.R. 595, 
Federal Tort Claims, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental 
Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives 98th Cong. April 27-28, 
1983. See P. Schuck, supra, note 2 at 82-99. 
30 Supra, note 27 at 193. See also ibid at 202-3. 
31 Ibid. at 203. 
32 Ibid at 9-12. 
33 Dicey used the word 'Crown', ibid. at 25. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Harry Arthurs makes the same error. H.W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A 
Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1. 
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work that has examined the instrumental impact of liability regimes on 
bureaucratic behaviour.36 
Finally, a critical perspective on law reform and the state demands 
that we examine the underlying structure of private law. Legalization 
of rights against the state, if that is what law reform involves, will 
perpetuate the application of common law values - focusing on 
individuals rather than the community, recognizing and giving priority 
to property and economic rights, attempting to control both bureaucrats 
and the community, refusing to consider legislative history and regulatory 
purposes, and, as Dicey put it, implementing policy that differs from 
existing ideas in representative legislation.37 Contract law28 tort law29 
and many of the other analytical tools used by judges have all been 
identified with particular ideologies. 
It is clear, for example, that applying private law to the state will, 
in many cases, mean invoking a model of law that draws its legitimating 
function from notions of corrective justice30 Certainly there may be public 
policy objectives other than, or at least in addition to, corrective justice. 
Corrective justice, with its orientation to the status quo, will justify 
compensation only where a particular person can be seen to have 
wrongfully deprived another particular person of certain rights. 
Furthermore, models of corrective justice often assume relevant actors 
who are equal in all respects. Law reform need not wed itself to either 
of these corrective justice ideals, and it seems to me that in deciding 
on models of state and law we need not adopt perspectives drawn from 
another time and culture. 
For all these reasons - the narrow methodology of the Working 
Paper, the use of Diceyian arguments, and an acceptance at this stage 
of legalization - it is not surprising that we may overlook the central 
issue - the design of institutions and processes through which individuals 
36 Project, "Suing the Police in Federal Court" (1979) 88 Yale LJ. 781; EJ. Littlejohn, "Civil 
Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct" (1981) 58 
U. Det. J. Urb. L. 365 at 428; G.A. Berrnann, "Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability" 
(1977) 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175 at 1190-202. 
The only explanation for employing Diceyian arguments is that Dicey is familiar to all of 
us, and has provided the philosophical foundation for much of the Canadian administrative law 
that has been created by judges. Perhaps they thought that Diceyian allusions would be comfortable 
to common-law administrative lawyers. In the end, I think that the Diceyian arguments weaken 
the proposals, which are sufficiently justifiable in their own right 
37 See A.V. Dicey, k w  and PubZic Opinwn in England (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 
1905). 
38 B. Mensch, "Freedom of Contract as Ideology" (1981) 33 Stan. L. Rev. 753; R. Unger, 
"The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561. 
39 See R. Abel, "A Critique of American Tort Law" (1981) 8 Brit. J. Law & Soc. 199. 
40 A vocal proponent of this school is R Epstein, who develops this theory in "A Theory 
of Strict Liability" (1973) 2 J. Leg. Stud. 151. 
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will be able to participate effectively in the definition and delivery of 
the benefits that they claim. Legalization may shift power to a limited 
degree, but the demoralization and alienation in modern western society 
is not likely to be overcome simply by allowing the demoralized to sue 
the state. 
V. CONTROLLING BUREAUCRATS AND CONTROLLING 
MAJORITIES 
The third source of confusion in this area of the law and in much 
of associated law reform is a failure to recognize that studying the 
relationship of individuals with the state involves studying two very 
different political processes. The first is the definition of the permissible 
limits of the exercise of majoritarian power or the exercise of power 
by coalitions of minorities at the expense of other minorities. On this 
view, implied rights to compensation when legislatures interfere with 
private property rights and private wealth should be understood as an 
attempt by judges to prevent the majority of us from abusing democratic 
power and from acting "unjustZy (and perhaps tyranically) toward a 
minority."41 This is a central concern in all democracies, and any study 
of the state in Canada must involve establishing a set of criteria as well 
as a way of thinking about the intractable problem of democracy and 
the tyranny of the majority. There is little doubt that the majority, in 
true democracies, can argue that their collective action is founded on 
a moral legitimacy to which private firms, individuals, and bureaucrats 
cannot appeal. 
This brings us to the second process defining the relationship of 
individuals to the state - the definition of the permissible limits of 
bureaucratic power. Here, we are concerned with the separation of 
ownership from control and power, which is characterized by the 
development of bureaucracies. The fragmentation of 'ownership' in 
democracies, the diffuseness of the interests of the electorate, the 
complexity of the operations of the state, and the limited capacity of 
individuals to predict the future and act on the basis of their predictions 
all lead to bureaucrats who are not accountable to the public. A concern 
with regulating bureaucratic conduct in these circumstances has been 
the overriding concern of judges in reviewing administrative action, and 
this is equally their concern when individuals seek compensation from 
the state or individual bureaucrats. But bureaucrats, unlike the majority, 
cannot point to their own interests as explanations for their actions and 
41 R.A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985) at 15. 
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as justifying judicial deference. Any law reform process that fails to express 
the distinction between these two very dissimilar problems (regulating 
bureaucrats and regulating majorities) may represent an anti-democratic 
manifesto. 
The problems I have described are revealed in the examination by 
the Commission of a specific area of state liability - tort liability of 
the Crown.42 The alleged purpose of the exercise is to inform us of the 
details of a special regime of public law applicable to the federal 
administration. The Commission argues that a special regime would 
"provide better safeguards for the rights of individuals," but the reason 
articulated by the Commission - "providing solutions adopted to their 
particular situations"43 - is entirely uniU-uminating. The analysis is little 
better. The Commission argues that the application of private law to 
state activities is "less than adequate," but we are not told why. They 
also argue that a more modern system would be simpler. We are not 
told, however, how this is just or right or more efficient; we are not 
told what the Commission means by a simpler system; and we are not 
given any idea as to how we can achieve this simpler, modern system. 
The Commission does suggest that direct state liability would be 
preferable to vicarious liability - on one view this would "correspond 
more closely to the nature of administrative activities."44 There is certainly 
something to be said in favour of designing liability regimes that can 
respond effectively to institutional wrongs, but as I explained earlier, 
it is not obvious that recognizing the state for tort law purposes will 
be a more effective regulatory device than requiring individual bureau- 
cratic responsibility.45 
The critical failure is the confusion between the review of distributive 
judgments of the state representing majority interests and the review 
of bureaucratic power. If the activity or injury is authorized in some 
sense, we should at least be concerned with majoritarian values. The 
Commission lumps together such ideas as "a failure to perform the 
obligations of the department," "the adoption of an illegal decision," 
"the fault of incompetence," and "an error in material operations," without 
defining or discussing them.46 A brief critique of one quote should be 
enough to illustrate my concerns. The Commission quotes with approval 
J. Donzelot, who argues that in many state liability cases an "accident 
42 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 69-74. 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid at 70-71. 
45 See HJ. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as a Crime - The Need 
to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 393. 
46 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 70, 71. 
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is usually . . . the result of the entire work process . . . [and] . . . those 
involved are thereby concerned . . . in compensating for the resulting 
injury."47 There is no analysis of the loss-shifting and loss-spreading 
abilities of the state. To say that the bureaucratic institution is liable 
to compensate for losses is facile, and certainly the Commission does 
not believe that the individual bureaucrats should be liable. The Com- 
mission, when it goes on to suggest that "sheer negligence" may justify 
personal liabilityps makes no attempt or perhaps is unaware of the 
enormous conceptual, political, and economic complexities in determing 
bureaucratic negligence. 
The Commission apparently ignores the fact that we are also 
regulating bureaucrats; simply because a bureaucrat is employed by a 
state institution does not necessarily mean that public resources should 
be used to compensate individuals whom she or he injures. Liability 
rules may have very little impact on bureaucracies, and the Commission 
ignores the considerable literature on bureaucratic deterrence.49 More 
significantly, it seems to me that we cannot provide compensation when 
a department is not doing what it ought to do without a thoughtful analysis 
of what we mean by 'ought to do' - obtuse references to 'objective' 
weighing with reference to the normal operations of the departmentso 
are not particularly insightful. If 'normal' operations involve non- 
compliance with external or internal standards, will compensation be 
denied? What if the 'normal' operations are lawful? Will lawfulness 
automatically insulate the state from liability? What if the losses are 
due to a Duplessis-like rogue bureaucrat? Dussault is quoted by the 
Commission in support for the proposition that compensation should be 
payable for "wrongful and damaging acts by the government."Sl We 
do not know, however, what that means unless we have some under- 
standing what we mean by "wrongful," and "government," and "dam- 
aging." Is the non-receipt of state benefits damage? The answer so far 
has been no. 
The Commission argues that 'logically' the imposition of direct 
liability in 1953 in limited circumstances should culminate in recognizing 
the direct liability of the administration alone. What is 'logical' about 
this? The 1953 Crown Liability Act52 retained the personal responsibility 
47 Ibid at 71, quoting J. Donzelot, L'invenrion du social (Paris: Fayard, 1984) at 131. 
48 Working Paper, ibid at 71. 
49 S e e  supra, note 36. 
Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 71. 
s1 Ibid. at 71 n.119. 
s2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38. 
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of bureaucrats. Moreover, law is not only logical, it is functional and 
normative. If the imposition of direct liability in 1953 failed to establish 
a more effective regulatory or compensatory tool, or if the 1953 Act 
does not reflect modem ideas about the relationship between individuals 
and the community, it would be illogical to extend its conceptual 
framework on a more general basis. 
The Commission alludes briefly to insurance-based compensation 
plans that may be appropriate in the state liability context, but again 
there is no indication that any serious thought has gone into the idea. 
They argue that no-fault insurance regimes would be more efficient and 
less onerous as they would require only a "direct link of cause and effect 
[to be] established between the damage and the activity."53 Even leaving 
aside questions of allocative efficiency, it is not clear to me that causation 
is as simple as that statement supposes it to be. What ought to be the 
result if a corporation locates an economic enterprise close to a state- 
owned nuclear power plant and subsequently suffers either economic 
losses when the nuclear power plant requires extensive periodic planned 
maintenance or property damage when the plant experiences a foreseeable 
radiation leak? Should compensation be payable? Who 'caused' the 
economic loss? Has the firm 'caused' the injury to itself? Has the state 
'caused' the economic loss if the firm was compensated a ante through 
a reduction in its capital investment? In one sense, the reduction in wealth 
is due to the confluence of two activities that reduces the actual or expected 
benefits available to either alone. The simplistic causation language 
conceals and distorts the analysis, which may depend upon an initial 
determination of rights or economic efficiency. 
Nor does the Commission appear to be aware of any of the other 
issues associated with compensation programs. What are the adminis- 
trative costs of no-fault liability regimes as compared to other com- 
pensation plans? Where is the analysis of moral hazard and the effect 
of insurance on victim and co-injurer behaviour? Should the source of 
the insurance payments be general revenues, or specific user fees? Should 
compensation be payable simply because the state exists, and because 
individuals need or deserve or have earned a particular level of wealth? 
Why should the state provide individuals with insurance for risks when 
private insurance is available? What are the 'social' risks that would 
be subject to this public compensation scheme? One could not have 
expected answers to these questions, but surely they ought to have been 
acknowledged. 
53 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 53. 
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Most important, the distinction between concerns with controlling 
bureaucracies and concerns with controlling majorities is ignored. 
Representative institutions undertaking deliberate redistributive programs 
resulting in welfare losses to some are discussed in the same breath 
as random, unplanned damage associated with state action. The majority, 
in some sense representing all of us in a democratic state, may decide 
to take wealth from some of us to benefit others. Of course that deprivation 
may not be just, and perhaps ought to be unlawful and compensable, 
but justice in such cases cannot be determined through an inquiry into 
the regulation of bureaucracies. In cases of majority action we are trying, 
as Robert Dahl put it, to develop ideas that will permit us to distinguish 
injustice or tyranny from the right use of the democratic process24 Unless 
we do so, we cannot know when losses associated with state action that 
redistributes benefits should be compensated. There is, of course, an 
extensive literature on this question - some policy analysts argue that 
because there is no net social loss in the case of transfer payments 
compensation is unnecessary25 Others suggest that the state, when it 
acts so as to reduce the market value of one person's wealth, is simply 
expressing demand that for one reason or another was not expressed 
in the market.56 Changes in taste expressed in the market do not give 
rise to compensable losses, so why should changes in taste expressed 
in the political process be treated differently? The Commission ignores 
all these questions, simply stating that "there is also a measure of social 
justice in not requiring the victim to bear the burden of an anonymous 
accident."57 
The Commission in a sense misses the point entirely. It is not enough 
to declare social justice, one must think about it. The Commission suggests 
that in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen,58 a case involving com- 
pensation for expropriation of property, the courts in providing com- 
pensation on a 'no-fault' basis "are tending to look at the problem of 
54 Dahl, supra, note 41. 
55 W. Bishop, "Economic Loss in Tort" (1981) 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 1. Compare MJ. Rizzo, 
"The Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop" (1981) 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 197. 
56 J. Knetsch, Property Rights and Compensation (Scarborough: Butterworth, 1983) at 11-12. 
57 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 73. 
58 (1978). [I9791 1 S.C.R. 101; see also Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel ha! 
(19201, [I9201 A.C. 508 (H.L.). 
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the Government's tortious liability in a new light."s9 Nonsense. It is an 
old light, a reflection of judicial values protecting property and economic 
interests, and an abhorrence of collectivist legislation. If we think that 
firms ought to be compensated in these cases we must think, as the 
Commission clearly has not, about democracy, majoritarian tyranny, 
utilitarianism, and rights to property. 
VI. THE LAW OF THE 'FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION' 
The Commission, notwithstanding its previous reliance on Dicey 
in proposing that the administration be subject to the ordinary lawto 
later calls for a radically anti-Diceyian reform. In effect, the Commission 
proposes an administrative law with a "distinctive meaning."61 This is 
the first we see of the implicit concept of a 'droit administratif, and 
one can presume that this administrative law is not to be administered 
in a judicial 'spirit', as Dicey would have it.62 We are not, however, 
told precisely what this distinctive meaning is, although the Commission 
does refer to the existing legal regime as one that "primarily benefits 
the administration"63 - a conclusion that would shock most administrative 
lawyers. One has the sense that the Commission favours the development 
of a vaguely defined independent system of law applicable to a unitary 
federal administration. It considers the retarded and incoherent devel- 
opment of public law concepts to be unrealistic in view of the growth 
of executive power during the postwar era. To be fair, the Commission 
does not, at this stage of its work, go so far as to advocate a separate 
system of administrative courts, but that is the overriding impression 
one has of its ultimate objectives. 
The second chapter of the working paper is devoted to developing 
those ideas - the Commission admits that while it believes change to 
be necessary, it does not know precisely where to go, and again the 
analysis is not persuasive. The task of law reform, as of any public policy 
analysis, must begin with a relatively detailed factual description of the 
59 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 73. The Working Paper concludes with a suggestion that 
the determination of compensation in disputes between the individual and the state should not 
be limited to 'curial' institutions. Brief mention is made of non-adversarial dispute resolution 
techniques, settlement and mediation processes, and the like. It is, however, somewhat surprising 
that there is no discussion at this point of relatively more interventionist institutions like ombudspersons 
and police commissions. And it is startling that the Working Paper fails to consider the central 
issue - the accountability of the new curial or non-curial institutions. The review institution may 
constitute another arm of the state with an independent ability to injure and deny benefits. 
60 Ibid at 23. 
61 Ibid at 26. These ideas are developed more fully at 34-59. 
62 Dicey, supra, note 27 at 30ff. 
63 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 27. 
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phenomenon one is studying. Here, the Commission provides us with 
an intellectual construct, but there are no case studies, no descriptions 
of bureaucratic activities and processes, and no analysis of the impact 
of current or proposed liability regimes. As well, one must identify the 
normative assumptions that underlie the analysis. Apparently, the Com- 
mission believes that the status of the federal administration should 
enhance the position of individuals in relation to the state.64 
The ensuing discussion of the conditions favouring individual rights 
fails to clarify those ideas. We are told that "the question of the rights 
of individuals has now become a central concern of administrative law."65 
There is, surprisingly, no acknowledgment that most of what we call 
administrative law, with its focus since the turn of the century on judicial 
review, has been devoted to controlling the exercise of majoritarian and 
bureaucratic power in favour of protecting the "rights of individuals." 
While some of us may now be questioning whether the judicial defence 
of some rights and the denial of others is correct, the conflict is an ancient 
one. It may be, as we move towards the twenty-first century, that we 
should discard our bias in favour of individual rights - or at least include 
in the concept of rights more than traditional ideas of contract and property. 
The Commission apparently believes that we should recognize the 
need for an arm of the state to act efficiently and to appreciate the 
"different logic" that justifies the executive branch of the state.66 Yet 
the discussion is so abstract as to be virtually meaningless. The idea 
that the executive branch has specialized functions that differentiate it 
from the legislative branch is trite. What is required in law reform is 
an analysis of the ways in which this specialized function operates in 
reality - policing, delivery of health care, provision of public goods 
such as parks, national defence and mass immunization programs, 
establishment of educational institutions, redistribution of wealth and 
taxation, rate regulation, licensing, and so on. 
As well, in designing a regime of public law it may be dangerous 
to adopt the Commission's implicit views that the bureaucracy is a benign 
entity simply fulfilling the wishes of its political or command masters. 
Other views are quite different. In these an activist, independent bu- 
reaucracy shapes state policy, and then actively implements that policy 
to achieve bureaucratically defined objects.67 The legitimacy of executive 
-- ~ 
64 Ibid at 43-59. 
65 Ibid at 34. 
66 Ibid at 60. 
67 See, for example, R.D. Cairns, Rationales for Regulation (Technical Report No. 2) (Ottawa: 
Economic Council of Canada, 1980) at 14-19. 
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action in this latter model is quite different from that which can be 
articulated in the case of passive bureaucracies. 
Current law reform analysis, the Law Reform Commission's work 
being no exception, is apt to turn to the "paramountcy of liberal conceptsW68 
for an ideology that favours the rights of individuals and. that should 
drive our conclusions regarding the design of individual-state relations. 
The Charter of Rights is seen as a reflection of liberal, individualistic 
concepts of freedom of speech and associated political rights, and rights 
to life, liberty, and security of the person. This focus on controlling state 
power in favour of individual rights should, according to the Commission, 
be reflected in our thinking about the legal status of the federal 
administration. While that proposition would seem straightforward, I have 
two reservations with such law reform. First, abstract legal theorizing 
too often fails to appreciate the intensely political nature of the debate 
that led to the recognition of individual liberties in the Charter. For 
example, the 'curious' omission of property rights in the Charter is 
explained as a reflection of a philosophy that identifies the individual 
as the sipreme value. Philosophy aside, it seems that historical analysis 
leads to the conclusion that property rights were excluded as a result 
of the federal government's perceived need for the support of the 
governments of several provinces, which were concerned with federal 
encroachment on provincial legislative jurisdiction over property matters,@ 
and not as a result of a particular view of the worth of individuals. 
Second, it is not clear to me that law reform should necessarily 
be concerned with the 'legalization' of the relationship of individuals 
and the state. As I argued earlier, the distribution of collective goods, 
economic regulation, and policing all require a view of the community 
as a vehicle for expressing communal values,70 and perhaps for protecting 
classes and individuals who are not able for one reason or another to 
use existing legal and political processes. Legalizing rights that are defined 
through well-developed democratic political processes is not necessarily 
a solution, nor is legalizing rights that have not been so defined. I have 
no quarrel with the thesis that we should be concerned about the welfare 
68 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 42. 
69 See R. Romanow, J. White & H. Leeson, Canada. . . NomirI2Sfanding (Toronto: Carswell, 
1983) at 77; A.C. Cairns, "The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada" in KG. Banting 
& R. Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985) at 121-27. 
70 Any theory of state liability must do more than protect private rights from state action. 
The state as the defendant should not be assimilated to the position of private enterprise - at 
the very least we can begin to understand state action as a reflection of communual values rather 
than private rights. 
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of individuals, but I have grave reservations about the prescription for 
alleviating the disease. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to draw on the Charter's equality rights 
provisions to justify a more general concern with individual welfare, and 
in this context the Commission argues that the recognition of equality 
rights reinforces restrictions on autonomous state action. After an extended 
discussion of equality rights,71 the Commission concludes that "Dicey 
clearly meant that. . . individuals and the administration should be subject 
to the same rules contained in the law."72 I do not agree. Dicey first 
argued that we should not recognize the administration; and second, that 
individual bureaucrats who acted unlawfully should be treated like 
individuals. He further argued that determinations of unlawfulness should 
be made by judges whose values and attitudes would be opposed in 
many cases to those of the administration.73 Dicey may have been right 
in his implicit assumption that if we want to control institutions we should 
in some instances ignore the institution, and focus our attention on the 
individuals who participate in and constitute the organization. Economic 
sanctions and stigmatization are effective regulatory tools only if the 
actors react to them. 
In any event, after suggesting that individuals and the administration 
should be subject to the same rules, the Commission makes perhaps its 
most significant proposal - that the administration and the individual 
should not be subject to equality of treatment. Why? Because the 
administration is different!74 Some would argue that the dialogue created 
by Rule of Law analysis is necessary. Here the dialogue results in a 
tautological conclusion that equality means equal treatment of equals. 
Law reform submits a conclusory statement that the state is different, 
thus justifying a special regime of law in light of those differences. We 
are left to wonder, for the time being, precisely what is so 'special' about 
the state that would justify those conclusions. 
VII. THE STATE IN MODERN CANADIAN SOCIETY 
In the end, the enterprise of law reform, an inquiry into state liability, 
and the definition of individual rights against the state must all address 
and answer the most difficult question - why should we recognize the 
state as an institution independent from its constituent actors? The answer 
is that the state, represented by those individuals who claim to exercise 
71 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 45-48. 
72 Ibid at 48. 
73 See Arthurs, supra, note 35 at 7-14. 
74 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 59-60. 
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monopolistic legitimate force and who redistribute benefits from the 
taxation of private funds, has no private analogies. If we are truly concerned 
with the control of bureaucratic power the inadequate delivery of public 
benefits, it is impossible to believe that our concerns will be ameliorated 
if we continue to ignore the state. The Law Reform Commission 
acknowledges as much in the final section of the working paper, which 
contains the Commission's most important and provocative ideas. 
The Commission argues that the vulnerability of the individual in 
her or his relationship with the state justifies the creation of a special 
legal regime defining and regulating bureaucratic power. The Commission 
observes that the individual "is in a position of dependence and vulner- 
ability,"75 and is isolated, powerless, and marginalized in a technical, 
scientifically-managed, -organized, and -controlled society. The tradi- 
tional authoritarian concept of sovereign immunity, with its associated 
ideas of subjugation and submission, reinforces the isolation of the 
individual. These ideas suggest that a concern with enhancing human 
dignity leads to a model of state liability that would restrict executive 
authority and insure the delivery of public benefits. 
While this idea is attractive, it deserves to be thought about further. 
First, law reform is misdirected if it does not appreciate the dual nature 
of state benefits. In some cases the state is providing the infrastructure 
for capitalist enterprise - rights to property and contract, rights to organize 
collectively, protection from certain competitive activities, institutions 
providing information, communications, transportation, and risk- 
spreading services, and associated private and public goods. In other 
cases, the state is providing individuals with personal benefits - un- 
employment benefits, housing, and health care - reflecting the welfare 
philosophies of the redistributive state and perhaps necessary if the state 
is to remain legitimate. The latter, and not the former, may be associated 
with demoralization, domination, surveillance, and dependence. Corporate 
benefits are certainly not, and if a concern with the imbalance of power 
and the dignity of individuals justifies reforms to adjust the relative power 
of individuals and the bureaucracy, indiscriminate application of the 
concept will only exacerbate existing inequalities between the two groups. 
Second, law reform must analyze the vulnerability, dependence, and 
demoralization that the Commission alleges are associated with state 
action. It may be that these social and personal phenomena are the result 
of the state, rather than the community or other individuals, providing 
the benefits. They are not necessarily associated with the state depriving 
individuals of entitlements or redefining the benefits. The lack of social 
75 Ibid at 53. 
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solidarity, the isolation of the individual from the community, and the 
disconnection between benefit and dessert may be the source of the 
discontent. If that is so, then the demoralization will not necessarily be 
reduced or eliminated by creating legal entitlements to those benefits. 
It may be true that the dependency and demoralization reflect particular 
bureaucratic insensitivities and capriciousness, but even then it is not 
at all certain that legalization is an effective bureaucratic regulatory 
technique. 
Third, law reform must address the way in which individuals do 
or can participate in the legislative and regulatory definition of these 
benefits. It seems to me that one way to reduce demoralization and 
dependency is to establish an institutional framework that will allow 
individuals and the community to participate effectively in the definition 
and delivery of the benefits. The Commission does not address this point 
and yet we cannot know what these benefits are unless we analyze the 
means used to distribute them. The demoralization that the Commission 
alleges is a feature of modem society may be as much the product of 
the attitudes of the bureaucrats and community that provide the benefits, 
the attitudes of private citizens who believe themselves to be independent 
of the state, the stigma that is (perhaps deliberately) associated with 
the receipt of state largesse, and the techniques of distribution that include 
surveillance, invasions of privacy, and restrictions on liberty. The legal- 
ization of these benefits, while it may shift the balance of power to some 
limited degree, is at the same time too blunt and too specific a tool. 
Fourth, law reform that is concerned with the non-receipt of public 
goods cannot be premised on a belief that all state benefits are equally 
deserved. Some of us may have other theories of distributive justice, 
but even if we did not, it is naive to ignore that at least some distributed 
public benefits are the result of political affiliation, bureaucratic self- 
aggrandizement, or worse. Simply because public resources are used to 
benefit others does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a collective 
decision to benefit the recipients has been made - it may simply represent 
a case of one group of individuals (bureaucrats) giving away wealth, 
originally owned or created by a second group, to a third group. Rather 
than giving this third group legal power to demand the benefit or 
compensation for its loss, perhaps we should continue to develop a public 
policy that ensures bureaucratic financial accountability. 
In the end, one should not depend solely on abstract concepts if 
one is truly concerned with the solution or amelioration of real social 
problems. The creation of legal rights against the state may shift power, 
but then only in marginal cases. We may lose sight of the real questions 
that deal with the quality of social benefits received by individuals and 
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the process of definition and distribution if we restrict our vision to the 
formal establishment of legal rights. 
Finally, the traditional response to concerns with state power has 
been judicial review, and as is to be expected, the Law Reform Commission 
focuses on the deficiences of this remedial process. I suppose that the 
Commission is arguing that we ought to think about a comprehensive 
restatement of individual rights in relation to the state since traditional 
methods of judicial review are inadequate to achieve the Commission's 
as yet unarticulated objectives. But it can be argued that, if we want 
to deny rights where their acknowledgment would necessitate redistri- 
bution of wealth, the current process of judicial review is just what one 
would expect. The Commission apparently fails to understand both the 
values and process associated with common law judging. Anyone familiar 
with the literature on judicial values and reasoning could not believe 
that "judges have simply recognized the existence and scope of a 
privilege."76 Recognition and definition are active processes, and common 
law judges have for decades attempted to restrict the operations of the 
state and of individual state representatives. In some cases the judges 
are attempting to control majorities; in others, they are concerned with 
bureaucratic power; but in all cases they will protect judicially defined 
and created property and economic rights. Implied rights to compensation 
on the expropriation of property rights77 are simply the most obvious 
manifestation of judicial values. To argue that common law judges favour 
the state and bureaucrats in the context of defining their relationship 
with individuals is unsupportable. 
The Commission recognizes that judicial review reflects judicial 
attitudes and values but concludes that the values reflect deference to 
the state. What they should be saying -what is more accurate - is that 
judges are protecting the wrong kinds of interests. Traditionally, a concern 
with protecting individual private property and economic rights has led 
judges to restrict the state when it attempts to interfere with the limited 
classes of private entitlements that judges have considered worthy of 
protection. Simultaneously, judicial concerns with 'rugged individualism', 
independence, and self-reliance make it difficult for recipients of state 
benefits to persuade judges that those benefits (which are needed but 
perhaps, according to judicial ideologies, not deserved) are similarly 
worthy of protection. Thus judges do defer to the state but only when 
it or individual bureaucrats interfere with the enjoyment of state largesse 
- only where recognition of private rights would be to countenance 
wealth redistribution. Certainly one can say that the judges are wrong 
in protecting one type of entitlement (property rights and economic 
76 Ibid at 55. 
77 See Tener v. Queen in Right of Brirish Columbia (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1. 
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expectations) against state action, while refusing to recognize the other, 
but that is a very different problem inherent in judicial review. 
Nonetheless, the Commission identifies the central idea in this context. 
The state exercises a benefit-granting function that has no private 
analogue. Tort, property, and contract ideas simply do not provide a 
conceptual apparatus that permits us to develop a public policy dealing 
with the delivery of state benefits. Contract law concepts are rigid, demand 
a specific exchange relationship or perhaps actual reliance, and reflect 
theories of promise and consent - none of which reflect the reality 
of the relationship of the state to the individuals to whom it is delivering 
public services. Tort law concepts, admittedly more flexible, might have 
been employed to achieve novel outcomes, but judges have not yet 
indicated that they understand the problems associated with the state 
delivery of benefits. As well, tort law, in light of its narrow focus on 
corrective justice and its unwillingness to accept that the non-receipt 
of expected benefits should be recognized as a wrong, is an unwieldy 
remedial tool. Similar arguments can be made about trusts, property, 
restitution, or any other of the familiar categories of common law thought. 
In all cases we protect existing common law entitlements, but do not 
recognize collectively defined entitlements with all of the redistribution 
that recognition would entail. In the end, I suspect that the Commission 
is right in thinking that a special regime of public law is necessary; 
but I have serious doubts that their research methodology, analytical 
framework, and understanding of the judicial and administrative processes 
will assist them in going any further. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Commission concludes that the recognition of new safeguards 
protecting the individual "would be eventually associated with the 
abandonment of the idea of the Crown as an operative concept in 
administrative law. If that idea were to disappear in the course of unifying 
the law applicable to the federal Administration, there is no doubt that 
entirely new systems could be created."78 It is not clear to me that the 
views of the Commission are fully developed - their approach is narrow, 
and the reasoning in the working paper is so abstract as to be meaningless. 
Nonetheless, there is considerable merit in an attempt to engender debate 
and discussion on the topic among the Canadian community. One of 
the most difficult and politically contentious projects of law reform is 
the reviewing of bureaucratic and majoritarian judgments and the design 
of new institutions and processes that recognize the modern Canadian 
state. 
78 Working Paper, supra, note 1 at 79. 
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